PDF NEW The Pacific War and Contingent Victory Ñ Michael W. Myers

Ent that would leave them with their gains in the Pacific southwest They did improve their WEAPONS AND THEIR ARMY AND AIR and their army and air were s I wanted to like this book but the I read it the I thought that Myers was beating a dead straw horse to mix metaphors And for all that I don t think he made a strong case for why Allied victory in the Pacific wasn t inevitable I think his discussion would have been better informed by a discussion of the US home front and war weariness since he concedes that the only way Japan could win was by forcing the US to negotiate and a discussion of unconditional Surrender In US Strategic Culture in US strategic culture making counterfactuals one needs to do better than say well this happened but it wasn t guaranteed to happen it is necessary to sort between plausible and implausible counterfactuals Myers really needed to grapple with how the US mobilized for and innovated during total wars in its past the civil war for example While the civil war was a different sort of war than the Pacific war the US nevertheless mobilized *in similarly creative ways invented new technology harnessed logistical and financial innovation *similarly creative ways invented new technology harnessed logistical and financial innovation Given this legacy arguably it is incumbent Myers to explain why the Pacific war was different. S Myers shows us had unforeseen and devastating logistical and strategic conseuences But the United States faced similar problems as well as other hurdles specific to a nation not yet on full war footingOverturning conventional historiography The Pacific War and Contingent Victory clarifies the proper relationship between freedom and determinism in historical thinking A compelling retelling of the Pacific war that might easily have been the book offers historical lessons in thinking about contemporary American foreign policy and American exceptionalism most saliently about the dangers of the presumption of American ascendan. ,


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The argument is fairly straightforward Is it true Japan was doomed to lose WWII as soon as they attacked America at Pearl Harbor Many writershistorians have taken this stance and uote the Japanese general Yamamoto I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve as evidence that Japan didn t have a chance against the USA They also point to the fact that America announced and followed a policy of fighting Germany first instead of the *enemy that actually attacked them as proof Japan did not have a *that actually attacked them as proof Japan did not have a to win against the USA However as the author points out for that to be true analysis ought to be able to demonstrate no reasonable "WAY FOR JAPAN TO WIN THE AUTHOR JAPAN "for Japan to win The author analyzes Japan desired no plan to invade USA mainland and then whether or not Japan had a chance to achieve their goal I won t go thru all of his arguments but I think he has some good points One I will mention the economyindustrial might of the USA is often noted a reason Japan could not hope to win against the efforts of the USA The author does point out that Germany had all of mainland Europe to draw manpower and industry from and yet lost despite their advantage While this does not prove Japan could have wo. About the Allies' victory in the Pacific in WWII it goes almost without uestion that Japan's defeat was inevitable in the face of overwhelming American military might and economic power But the outcome Michael W Myers contends was actually anything but inevitable This book is Myers's thorough and deeply informed explanation of how contingent the foregone conclusion of the war in the Pacific really wasHowever disproportionate their respective resources both Japan and the Allied forces confronted significant obstacles to ultimate victory One the two sides shared Myers shows was the lack of a single individual with the nowled. N it does show that it is not without precedent for a nation with the industrial *advantage to lose The book itself was a bit slow in parts but the time *to lose The book itself was a bit slow in parts but the time discussing possibilities and history are not wasted and this is a thoughtful book that asks the reader to consider some interesting uestions about how the war could have gone differently This is a well written book with an interesting thesis however I did not "find it particularly captivating even with me being a history buff I "it particularly captivating even with me being a history buff I appreciate the rebuttal the author provides and articulates The premise of this book is straight forward My biggest issue with this book is that the evidentiary support for the author s thesis is just as subjective as the position he attempts to debunk Subjective does not necessarily eual bad and overall I agree with his thesis but in the end this book was less interesting and compelling than I had hoped If you are looking for an alternative history books this is not your book if you are looking at a book that analyze contigency this is your book In this book the authors demonstrate that Japan was not doomed to defeat in WW2 Theirs goals were realistic gaining a defensive perimiter and grinding American troops to have a netioated settelm. Ge vision and authority to formulate and implement effective strategy Both exercised leadership by committee and Myers cogently explains how this contributed to the contingent nature of the conflict A remarkable exercise in logical methods of strategic thinking his book analyzes decisive campaigns in the Pacific War examining the economic and strategic challenges that both sides faced and had to overcome to achieve victory Japan for instance had two goals going into the war to expand the boundaries of what they termed the Greater East Asia Co Prosperity Sphere and to end their long and frustrating war in China These goals .
The Pacific War and Contingent Victory